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Abstract 
This article traces how the development of regional law is linked to the state of 
regional integration in Africa. Given the prominent role European Union law plays in 
the functioning of the European Union, the question is posed whether there is similar 
scope for the development of ‘African Union law’, a term not established hitherto. 
Initially devoid from the necessary supranational elements required to adopt law that 
would automatically bind member states, the African Union is leaning towards a 
functionalist approach paving the way for transfer of sovereign powers to African 
Union institutions. It is argued that law-making capacity, be it through the activities of 
the Pan-African Parliament, the Peace and Security Council or the African court 
system are necessary requirements to accelerate the process of regional integration. 
African Union law will hold member states accountable to comply with international 
and continentally agreed standards on, inter alia, democracy, good governance and 
human rights.  
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Introduction 
European integration through the European Union (EU) and the development of 
European Union law can be regarded as parallel processes in many respects. All EU 
members are bound to follow EU law and their courts must provide a remedy for 
those who seek to enforce their rights under it. In the United Kingdom, EU law has 
been made a compulsory subject for students wanting to practice as lawyers 1  
Teaching law in the United Kingdom, a reluctant EU member at most, enforces the 
realisation of just how deeply EU law impacts the national legal systems of members. 
EU law is, to a large extent, the glue that binds European integration together. 
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Despite African integration being high on the agenda of African legal scholars, 
politicians and bureaucrats, the term ‘African Union law’ is largely unknown. The 
study of African Union (AU) institutions and comparative African legal systems 
abounds, with the latter focusing on the national legal systems of individual AU 
members. Within the context of the prominence of EU law, this article will address 
the question whether there is similar scope for development of law emanating from 
the AU. In other words, what is the capacity of the AU to adopt legally enforceable 
decisions that will bind its member states as a matter of supreme law? In doing so, 
this article will trace how the development of a regional legal system can be linked to 
the state of regional integration in Africa. It will suggest that the development of AU 
law is a necessary step for the deepening of continental integration by critically 
reflecting on the current and potential role of AU institutions. 
 
Integration theories and terminology 
Many political theorists have attempted to define supranationalism,2 the holy grail of 
regional integration, and apparent touch stone for the creation of regional law. The 
concept of supranationalism was first used to characterise the high authority in the 
European Coal and Steel Community. 3 While some regard it as referring to an 
institutional hierarchy, others relate it to unitary or federal structures4 or the demise 
of sovereignty. Haas supports the interpretation that supranationalism refers to a 
‘type of integration in which more power is given than is customary in the case of 
conventional international organisations, but less than is generally yielded to an 
emergent federal government’.5 More recently, authors such as Reinisch prefer to 
identify the following characteristic elements: majority voting in decision-making 
institutions; the power to bind outvoted members; a system of obligatory settlement 
of disputes; direct effect; and supremacy.6  These elements speak to the binding and 
enforceable nature of decisions and the supreme status they would enjoy in a 
hierarchy of norms which form the essence of law-making capacity and thus the 
requirement for the development of regional law. Essential elements of 
supranationalism can therefore be regarded as sine qua non for regionally 
enforceable law, be it in Europe or Africa.    
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The AU and its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), have been 
classified as interstate as opposed to supranational by commentators such as Olivier 
et al in 2004. 7 Interstate cooperation or state-centrism can be described as an 
altogether more modest form of integration where the focus remains on the 
participating units instead of the jointly established and overarching legal persona. 
According to O’Neill, the state-centric paradigm ‘focussed theoretical attention on the 
durability of the nation state’ and regards regionalism as another arena for 
international politics. 8  Within a state-centric configuration the inability of taking 
enforceable decisions prevents the establishment of a regional legal system through 
institutional action. The question is whether such an assertion remains valid ten 
years later. Over the said period, the AU, spearheading African integration, has 
made significant progress to cement the building blocks of regional integration. 
Given the legal context of the present discussion, supranationalism in the AU will be 
determined by examining its institutions, their powers and decision-making capacity, 
as well as sovereign powers transferred from member states to these organs. The 
level of achievement in this regard will be indicative of the state of evolution of AU 
law. Institutional development will be traced through the tentative evolution of the 
Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR), and an AU courts system, as well as the African peace and 
security architecture and their concomitant decision making powers. Likewise AU 
institutional action and instruments directing action against absolute sovereignty by 
imposing democratic governance and human rights standards on member states, 
are discussed below.  
Haas further regards the process of community formation and embracing of a 
separate identity as important integration criteria. 9  Although the AU has not 
challenged nationalism through transcending existing nations in any way, it has 
succeeded in mainstreaming African unity and pan-Africanism at an ideological level. 
The political and ideological goals of the AU have been clearly communicated, 
although there has been limited success at the level of delivery through enabling 
treaty provisions, and most importantly, through actual institutional practice.  
The AU is often compared to the EU but differs significantly at an institutional level.10 
Similarly, their historic integration experiences and conditions differ vastly. Where the 
European integration process aimed to make economic interests of member states 
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mutually entwined, 11  African integration was built on the belief that strong and 
impenetrable sovereign states were desirable. While post-colonial ideology paid lip 
service to pan-Africanism, politicians stopped short of mustering the political will to 
move beyond interstate cooperation. African states expressed a strong commitment 
to sovereignty yet failed to produce the strong national institutions needed – creating 
instead national enclaves of failed governance.12 Yet, certain similarities with the 
European integration experience can be identified. The latter was a slow and 
incremental process, as illustrated by Monet’s view that the European Coal and Steel 
Community was ‘integrating Europe by stealth’ for example.13 European integration, 
like African integration, has also experienced many setbacks and periods of 
stagnation, such as the recent Eurozone crisis, the decline in national economies 
within the EU and the recent threat of the UK either to withdraw from or to 
renegotiate its membership conditions. However, in Europe, problems have been 
dealt with through constitutional and functional innovations14 as reflected in a flexible 
integration paradigm. Functionalism promotes ‘functional cooperation between states, 
engaging them in cooperative ventures… to establish functionally specific agencies, 
transcending national boundaries, managed by technocrats, not influenced by 
political ideology or individual states.’ 15  Schuman and Monnet are regarded as 
proponents of this more pragmatic approach. 16  The EU has followed a hybrid 
approach combining features of the two dominant integration theories, viz, 
supranationalism17 (federalist models) and state-centrism (intergovernmentalism and 
confederalism).18  
A range of alternative or variant theories have emerged in the European context 
since the late 1980s, replacing the intergovernmental/supranational dichotomy by 
emphasising the interests of strategic actors and (constructivist) approaches driven 
by norms, ideas and principles.19  
This article seeks to suggest that Africa is, despite formidable stumbling blocks, 
likewise being integrated by stealth through the adoption of functionalism and that 
the incremental development of AU law is an important tool in this process. Although 
state-centrism may still be regarded as the dominant integration paradigm within the 
AU, the AU has embraced a variety of supranational impulses responding to 
strategic needs that have influenced norms and principles, as will be indicated. To 
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illustrate how a regional legal system might function in relation to national legal 
systems of member states, it is useful to consider the EU model. 
Hierarchy of norms within the EU 
In order to understand the structure and imperative of EU law, it is important to 
consider the vertical order within the system, meaning that legal acts lower down the 
hierarchy will be subject to legal acts of a higher status. 20  In theory, different 
approaches may regulate the relationship between regional law as a form of 
international law and national legal systems of individual participating states. Under 
the traditional dualist model, international law and national law of a state belong to 
two distinctly different legal orders.21 When a state decides to become a party to a 
treaty, it must first obtain the necessary constitutional approval before it can proceed 
to bind the state at an international level. Dualist thinking holds that such a treaty 
must then be incorporated into the domestic or national legal system of states. Only 
then can national courts apply treaty law as transformed into the law of the land. 
Domestic application of international law depends on this act of transformation which 
theoretically eradicates the possibility of a conflict between international and 
domestic law. Customary international law obligations, which are by nature 
uncodified, are generally regarded as part of the law of the land unless inconsistent 
with national legislation and, should there be a conflict between custom and 
legislation, legislation will prevail. 
 This approach is followed by many former British colonies, as was the case in South 
Africa before the adoption of the 1993 Constitution 22  which abolished the 
Westminster system.23 The 1993 Constitution replaced parliamentary sovereignty 
with constitutional supremacy, a notion that is again reflected in section 2 of the 1996 
Constitution. 24  Sections 231 and 232 of the 1996 Constitution provide that 
incorporated treaties and customary international law must comply with the 
constitution above all as the ultimate yardstick for legality. The idea that legislation 
(including legislation incorporating treaties) can be judicially reviewed to comply with 
constitutional requirements is not part of the British legal tradition. Similarly, 
customary international law will only form part of the law of the land as long as it 
complies with both the constitution and acts of Parliament.  
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Monist thinking, on the other hand, regards international and domestic law as 
different components of the same system. Once a state has decided to become a 
party to a treaty, that treaty will automatically become part of its national law and 
courts will apply it as such. In some systems it will enjoy the same status as 
legislation, while in others it might even override conflicting legislation.25 The South 
African Constitution of 1996 introduces elements of monism through section 231(4) 
which provides that ‘a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament’. ‘Self-execution’ means that relevant treaty 
provisions will enjoy ‘direct effect’ in domestic law. No incorporating legislation will 
thus be required to make such provisions part of domestic law although it would 
remain subject to the constitution and parliamentary legislation. Kirsch identifies a 
trend of ‘creeping monism’ in many common law countries, provoking a globalisation 
of national constitutions on the basis of international or regional norms.26 
The monist approach is the most directly linked to the ‘direct effect’ component of 
supranationalism: Norms must be sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to be 
invoked before national courts.27 Normally the constitutional law of states will govern 
the status international law enjoys in the national legal order. However, if legislative 
powers are granted in terms of the constitutive treaty of a regional integration regime, 
such acts will enjoy direct effect by virtue of sovereign powers voluntarily transferred 
by member states to that effect. In the case of the EU, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) developed case law endorsing the direct effect of Union Law as an inherent 
characteristic of EU law.28 In the case of Costa v. Enel,29 the ECJ underlined the 
autonomous and supreme nature of Community Law, 30 which will – in case of 
conflict between a directly applicable community norm and a norm of national law – 
prevail. The primacy or supremacy of European Community (EC) law places it at the 
apex of a hierarchy of international and national norms as envisaged by Reinisch’s 
understanding of supranationalism. 
Within the EU, the principle legal instruments are regulations, directives and 
decisions. The EU treaties stipulate the conditions for the legality of such instruments. 
Regulations bind and are directly applicable in all member states. Directives do not 
necessarily address all member states, and provide flexibility by leaving some choice 
as to the form and method of implementation to such states. They are binding in 
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respect of the end to be achieved. A decision binds only those states to which it is 
addressed in its entirety. All these instruments presuppose supranationalism to some 
degree. The Lisbon Treaty operates as a constitutional treaty and stipulates the 
following tiers of norms in descending order: the Constituent Treaties (ie, Treaty on 
the European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and the 
Charter of Rights; general principles of law; legislative acts; and implementing acts.31 
The raison d'être for EU law lies in the transfer of powers from member states to EU 
institutions. Such powers are not open-ended but limited to specific areas identified 
in treaties. The primary sources of EU law are thus the main treaties establishing the 
EU (originally the European Economic Community, EURATOM, and the Maastricht 
Treaty, which were amended by the Treaties of Amsterdam, Niece and Lisbon). It is 
against this background that the focus will now turn back to the AU in an effort to 
address the dual questions: Have member states transferred sovereign powers to 
the AU; and is the AU endowed with law-making capacity? 
Legal nature of the AU and its ability to create law 
The legal nature of the AU and its capacity to create law are separate yet interlinked 
questions. The AU and its institutions are established under international law by 
means of treaty. Such treaties determine the AU’s structures, powers and functions 
but do not establish AU law as such. A second requirement must be complied with: 
Does the AU have the power to take binding and enforceable decisions? Direct 
effect and supremacy of such decisions will point to elements of supranationalism 
needed to create AU law. 
It is a well-settled principle of international law that international organisations such 
as the AU might enjoy international legal personality. Whether such personality 
exists will hinge on the actual constitutional status of the organisation. An important 
indicator of personality will be the capacity of the organisation to conclude treaties 
with states and other organisations and the status it has been given under municipal 
law. 32  In the Reparations case33 the International Court of Justice confirmed that the 
United Nations had indeed the necessary legal personality to bring actions against 
states. Although the Constitutive Act of the AU is silent on the matter, the fact that 
the AU has entered into treaties, adopted a vast number of treaties and been a party 
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to international disputes are indications of the acceptance of its international legal 
personality. 
Both the OAU and the AU were established by means of multilateral treaties open to 
accession by African states. As treaties, the Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity34 and the Constitutive Act of the African Union35 are law-creating instruments 
listed as a source of international law by Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. These treaties are categorised as constitutive 
instruments similar to the UN Charter, with the purpose to establish and act as 
constitutions for the institution at hand.36 The legality of all actions by the AU organs 
will have to fall within the scope of the constitutive treaty in order to comply with 
requirements of legality.37  
The rules underlying national constitutional law, the necessary changes having been 
made (mutatis mutandis), inform the interpretation of international constitutive 
instruments. It implies the presence of bodies with authority in the legislative, 
executive and judicial domains. Material elements such as humans rights or 
economic and trade regulation often appear in separate treaties. Neves 
acknowledges that highly diverse models of ‘global domestic politics’ will be reflected 
in the international order. Consequently he suggests that certain supranational 
powers are presupposed when examining constitutionalisation of the international 
order. 38  Constitutionally speaking, a key condition for the construction of 
supranationality would entail broad norms and decisions directly binding citizens and 
organs of state.39 The AU institutions and powers under the Constitutive Act will be 
assessed against this background with a view to establish the capacity to bind its 
member states and their citizens.  
 
Constitutive instruments of the OAU and AU: Purpose and powers 
The OAU was established in 1963 to consolidate unity and lead the struggle against 
all forms of colonialism. The recognition of an ‘inalienable right of all people to 
control their own destiny’ as expressed in the preamble of the OAU Charter is 
reflected in the importance attached to sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 
purposes of the OAU identify the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence, regarding these as preconditions for the eradication of colonialism.40 
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Absolute sovereignty developed into a mantra that shielded Africa from many 
instances of foreign intervention under the OAU.  
The charter is silent about regional law and the taking of binding decisions but does 
call on member states to harmonise their policies in order to achieve the purposes 
set out for the OAU.41 No mention is made of legal harmonisation, the transferring of 
any sovereign powers or endowing AU institutions with binding decision-making 
capacity. The OAU thus fits the definition of an interstate organisation devoid from 
supranational powers. The purposes of the OAU, set out in article 2, are echoed in 
the OAU’s principles (article 3) listing sovereign equality, non-interference and 
territorial integrity and linking them to independence. Here too, no scope is allowed 
for any form of external law, including supranational law of African origin, onto the 
domestic legal systems of member states. Freed from the yoke of colonialism but 
besieged with new challenges at a continental level, the OAU became defunct. 
Replaced by the AU in 2001, continental priorities shifted to uniting Africa through 
increased regional integration. The AU’s integration agenda was driven by efforts 
towards economic cooperation but also a new political emphasis on democratisation, 
human rights, good governance and the rule of law.42 
The AU is ‘guided by a common vision for a united and strong Africa’. 43  The 
preamble of its Constitutive Act contains broad indicators permitting the development 
of continental law by referring to the promotion and protection of human rights, 
consolidation of democratic institutions and provisions to ensure good governance 
and the rule of law.  Though one might argue that these goals can be achieved only 
through law, no direct and few indirect references are made in the act to the 
possibility of enforceable action.   
The objectives of the AU to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of its member states, coupled by a commitment to accelerate (only) 
political and socio-economic integration44 leave little room for an interpretation that 
legal integration is included as an objective. Although most of the objectives and 
principles45 are phrased as soft commitments of promoting and advancing such 
integration, instead of regulating and exercising powers, one might argue that some 
measure of legal regulation would be inevitable to shoulder the burden. A clear 
authorisation of AU intervention in a member state, in principle a violation of 
10 
 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, is provided for by paragraph (h) of article 4, and 
may take place pursuant to an assembly decision in respect of war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity. The question that needs to be considered now is 
whether the AU, as an international legal person, has the power to create law 
through its organs? 
The purpose of this article is not to discuss the individual AU organs in detail, but 
rather to assess whether their powers and functions endow them with law-making 
capacity. Powers granted by the Constitutive Act, as the constitution of the AU, can 
be regarded as original powers flowing from an original source of law. The validity of 
a particular measure taken by an AU institution must be established by considering 
the source document. The Constitutive Act refers to nine organs (or categories of 
organs in the case of financial institutions):46 the Assembly of the Union; the AU 
Executive Council; the Pan-African Parliament; the Court of Justice; the Commission; 
the Permanent Representatives Committee; the specialised technical committees; 
the Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and the financial institutions. Some 
organs are however regulated by separate or secondary treaties as pointed out 
below. The power granted to the assembly to establish additional organs is an 
important aspect.47 In 2002, the Peace and Security Council was established and 
added as an organ of the AU.48 
The AU Assembly 
The AU Assembly is the ‘supreme organ’49 of the AU, composed of heads of state 
and government or accredited representatives, and is empowered to take a wide 
range of decisions. 50  Despite the absence of any clarification provided on the 
meaning of ‘supreme organ’, one can assume it enjoys the highest position in the 
hierarchy of AU organs, or that its decisions cannot be challenged by other organs 
which would include the Court of Justice, as in the case of a supreme or sovereign 
national parliament. 51  The assembly has powers that might have legal 
consequences, such as the monitoring of AU policies and decisions; the 
responsibility to ensure compliance by all member states;52 and giving directives to 
the executive council on the management of conflicts. 53  Additionally, failure to 
comply with decisions and policies may be subjected to sanctions determined by the 
assembly. 54  It is interesting to note that non-compliance with policies might 
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potentially carry the same penalty as non-compliance with decisions. Implementation 
of such sanctions can be regarded as binding on all member states and therefore 
present a supranational element to the assembly’s powers. The assembly may also 
impose a range of ‘soft’ sanctions on a member state that is in default of paying its 
contributions to the AU, such as the denial of the right to speak at meetings, to vote 
or to present a candidate for an AU position. Governments which come to power 
through unconstitutional means may also be suspended from participation in AU 
activities. 55  The sanctions associated with non-payment of contributions are 
therefore similar to penalties faced by a new government taking power outside the 
scope of the constitution in force at the time. These penalties are devoid of 
supranational legal content, as they do not have any tangible effect on member 
states. The assembly further holds the power to determine the structure and 
functions of the Commission, which is also the secretariat of the AU .56  
The AU Executive Council 
The AU Executive Council (hereafter the council), is composed of ministers of 
foreign affairs or other ministers or authorities designated by member states to take 
decisions on policies in common areas of interest.57 As indicated by its title, the 
council is designed to operate at an executive level, being responsible to the 
assembly under article 13(2) of the AU Constitutive Act. The council is also 
empowered to monitor implementation of assembly policies.58 This is a much more 
limited and focussed responsibility compared to the assembly’s power to monitor 
implementation of AU policies and decisions as well as to ensure compliance. It can 
be concluded that the assembly is entrusted with much stronger, potentially 
enforceable powers within the AU, but also externally among member states, 
compared to the council. 
Specialised technical committees 
The specialised technical committees created under article 5(1) are, inter alia, 
responsible to prepare and oversee AU projects, but lack any original decision-
making power. 
 Analysis will focus on the PAP59, the ACHPR and the Court of Justice, 60 which 
have been established by separate treaties, as well as the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) of the AU. The PSC will be the standing decision-making organ for 
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the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts61 and was added as an AU 
organ under the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union adopted in 2003, which will come into operation once ratified by two thirds of 
AU member states.62 The Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union was adopted and entered into force on 26 December 2003, after being 
ratified by the required majority of member states of the AU.  
The Pan-African Parliament  
The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was adopted through a protocol that entered into 
operation in 2003.63 Despite claiming to represent all African peoples64, the PAP 
currently has only advisory and consultative powers.65 Article 2 states as an ultimate 
aim the evolvement into an institution with full legislative powers, where members 
are elected by universal adult suffrage. However, this can only be brought into effect 
when members agree to amend the said protocol and a separate agreement is thus 
required. Article 11 further states that the advisory and consultative powers will last 
for the first five years of its existence, after which legislative powers are to be defined 
by the AU Assembly. 66 Initial advisory and consultative powers include possible 
efforts directed towards legal harmonisation or co-ordination between the member 
states. Efforts aimed at harmonisation would presumably be governed by separate 
treaties and would, at most, contribute to a harmonising of domestic legal systems in 
Africa and thus not lend credibility to the creation of AU law. Moreover, 
harmonisation efforts are mostly directed towards private and commercial law 
regimes. This falls outside the scope of enforceable AU decision-making powers.  
The evolving of a parliament in the traditional constitutional sense of the word with 
legislative powers is thus a possibility if certain conditions are met. It is foreseen that 
the continental parliament will oversee the executive structures of the AU (including 
the assembly, executive council, the commission and the permanent representative 
committee) once it is granted legislative power in its second term.  
In 2009 a review of the protocol establishing the PAP was requested by the 
commission as required by article 25 of the protocol. A draft amendment was 
approved with reservations by the executive council in 2012 for tabling at the 20th 
ordinary session of the assembly in January 2013, where it was decided that more 
in-depth consultation was needed. 67 Bethel Amadi, the president of the PAP, has 
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commented that ‘the PAP is consolidating a revised protocol pertaining to its 
legislative authority, and looking forward to playing a part in the increased legitimacy 
of AU institutions’. 68  These powers are needed to develop ‘transnational 
accountability’ and ensure effective implementation of AU policies – thus fully 
fledged AU law. 
As yet, this has not occurred and the debate on the role that the PAP should play 
continues to rage.69 Having reached the end of its first term, commentators express 
doubt about the PAP’s ability to realise the vision of becoming a full legislative 
body.70 The absence of legislative powers with concomitant enforcement capacity, 
coupled with the fact that members are not directly elected but nominated, are 
crucial factors standing in the way of the PAP’s transformation. Many are sceptical 
that the wish to accelerate regional integration by addressing the factors identified 
will ever go beyond political summits and that the PAP will remain an assembly of 
national parliamentarians. One view identifies the fact that states are ‘increasingly 
resentful of interference in their domestic matters’ as a reason for the reluctance of 
leaders to put their money where their mouths are.71  
If the PAP is to become ‘a model of true parliamentary democracy’, 72 which is 
needed for further regional integration and to present a consolidated continental 
voice in global politics, it will need to make inroads into the previously sacrosanct 
domains of national parliaments. Therefore, it is important that the evolving of law-
making powers includes the ability to infringe on the sovereignty of member states, 
in the same way that EU membership qualifies the sovereign rights of members not 
to legislate contrary to EU Law. Such law-making capacity will require a qualified 
interpretation of the commitment to the sovereignty of member states pledged by the 
Constitutive Act of the AU. This tension is well expressed in the words of the Clerk of 
the PAP when he notes that ‘there are still some Member States that see the PAP as 
a bit of a nuisance, largely because the stronger we become the more we challenge 
their unfair practices’.73  
A further factor to consider is that the PAP may only be vested with law-making 
powers as defined by the assembly. In effect the assembly, as executive body, will 
decide on the powers to grant to a body which will end up overseeing the executive. 
This can result in a competition over competencies and powers where the executive 
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is reluctant to agree to legislative powers which will counter the current executive 
dominance.74 The need that the PAP and the rest of the AU to speak with one voice 
underlines the importance that the hierarchy of institutions is settled.75  
National parliaments of member states are often perceived as natural allies for 
enhanced regional integration and the expansion of the PAP’s powers,76 led by the 
belief that they would be empowered through engaging at a continental level with 
other parliaments. However, this consideration may not be of much relevance as a 
factor to speed up the PAP’s legislative evolution; majority parties in national 
parliaments will not have the same influence in a continental parliament and end up 
unable to influence decisions in ways that will suit national interests and political 
agendas. 
When considering the evolution of legislative powers, one must keep the possible 
theoretical relationship between the continental parliament and national parliaments 
in mind within federal or confederal configurations. The nature and extent of 
legislative powers granted will determine whether a parliament will evolve into a 
supreme parliament, overriding national parliaments on certain matters, or add an 
additional layer of legislative authority. Given the lengthy period it took the European 
Parliament to develop its legislative powers and the low level and slow pace of 
integration in Africa, it is difficult to see how the PAP will ever develop into a ‘supra 
parliament’. That is however not a requirement for the existence of African Union law, 
which would merely need some form of, albeit limited, legislative capacity. To pave 
the way towards law-making powers, the president of the PAP has pointed to efforts 
by the PAP to assure member states that a transformed parliament will ‘coexist with 
national and regional parliaments in a manner that will not derogate from or erode 
their powers or national sovereignty’. 77  Further steps will, however, be needed 
before the PAP and the rest of the AU can speak with one voice.  
In addition to the PAP, regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa have 
parliaments of their own that contribute to regional integration.  These are: 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)78, the East African 
Legislative Assembly (EALA)79, the SADC Parliamentary Forum80 and the Network 
of Parliamentarians of the Economic Community of Central African States 81  
(ECASS). Generally speaking, the powers of these parliamentary bodies are weak 
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and limited 82  and the PAP’s relationship with the different regional parliaments 
remains undefined. 
Having considered the PAP’s current lack of legislative capacity, analysis will now 
consider whether the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of 
Justice are endowed with the capacity to shape AU law. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
An African notion of human rights as reflected in various human rights instruments 
has steadily gained recognition since the adoption of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights in 1981. The Charter recognises a full spectrum of human rights 
and establishes the ACHPR (not to be confused with the Commission established 
under article 20 of the Constitutive Act of the AU) to act as a supervisory 
mechanism. The enforceability of these rights by AU institutions will provide an 
important indicator of the existence of supranational law.  
The ACHPR Commission is a quasi-judicial body charged with monitoring the 
implementation of the charter and promoting and protecting human and peoples’ 
rights in Africa.83 As part of the African human rights system, the ACHPR has a very 
broad mandate,84 ranging from studies on human and peoples’ rights to formulating 
rules and principles aimed at resolving human rights problems. Although not 
explicitly stated, it may be argued that the ACHPR ’s broad mandate to achieve the 
promotion and protection of human rights includes a possible derivative collective 
human security mandate.85 It may receive communications from state parties about 
charter violations by other state parties, but also from individuals and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) who are not necessarily aggrieved parties.86 
Although incapable of making binding decisions, the ACHPR is well placed to act as 
a human rights watch-dog by interpreting charter provisions; considering interstate 
and other complaints; and analysing the reports submitted by state parties on their 
implementation of the charter and other African human rights conventions.87  
The utopian-sounding right of ‘all peoples to national and international peace’ 
referred to in article 23 of the charter, together with the broad spectrum of human as 
well as peoples’ rights, casts the net for the commission’s work on human rights very 
wide. Resolutions adopted by the ACHPR seek further to define provisions of the 
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charter and, as such, provide an important normative resource. Examples include 
resolutions urging Rwanda to prevent acts of reprisal and vengeance in the post-
genocide period;88 condemning anti-personnel landmines;89 condemning the 2006 
coup d’état in The Gambia 90  and reinforcing peace agreements; and declaring 
maternal mortality a violation of women’s rights to life, dignity and equality, including  
calls on governments to address the issue;91 and to provide access to health care.92  
These resolutions are not intended to have binding force, as they merely call on 
states to follow a certain course of action. They are phrased in a similar vein to UN 
General Assembly resolutions, putting pressure on states to promote and protect 
human rights. Resolutions have the character of soft law even if there are examples 
where condemnation has been phrased in very bold language,93 and where the 
ACHPR was willing to read-in socio-economic rights (housing and food) 94  not 
explicitly protected in the charter. Decisions by the ACHPR dealing with complaints 
by individuals against governments under article 55 are likewise not binding but 
contain declarations and recommendations by the ACHPR directed at the 
government. These are again phrased in soft language. The decision in Malawi 
African Association and Others v Mauritania95 illustrates this point. The case dealt 
with accusations of slavery and other human rights violations following a coup d’état 
in Mauritania in 1984. After analysing Mauritania’s international human rights 
obligations, the ACHPR identified and condemned discriminatory practices against 
black Mauritanians. It declared that there were grave or massive human rights 
violations as proclaimed by the AU Charter. The ACHPR concluded by making a 
number of recommendations to the government including that it conduct an 
independent inquiry into disappeared people; take diligent measures to replace 
confiscated national identity documents; take appropriate measures to compensate 
widows of the victims; and take appropriate measures to enforce the abolition of 
slavery in Mauritania. 
An assessment of how effective the ACHPR has been in advancing human rights 
can only be made within the context of its mandate. Okafor regards the outputs of 
the ACHPR as ‘resources to be mobilized by other actors (such as states, non-
governmental organizations, sub-state groups and individuals)’.96 Much has been 
written about the ACHPR’s limitations which include various operational factors such 
as a lack of resources, institutional problems, and importantly, a weak state 
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compliance record. 97  The benefit of entertaining individual petitions is rendered 
almost worthless if set off against low compliance. One may speculate whether the 
compliance is low because the decisions are non-binding to start with, or whether 
states are not persuaded because they do not recognise the authority of the ACHPR 
to pass judgment on their domestic violations.   
The work of the ACHPR clearly establishes the importance of its role in developing 
and interpreting human rights at a normative level. The non-binding nature of 
decisions serves to highlight the shortcomings in the role of the African Commission 
to produce outputs, as one would expect from a supranational dispute resolution 
institution.98 Given these shortcomings in the role of the ACHPR and the massive 
scale of human rights abuses in Africa, the Protocol on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted by the OAU in 1998. The 
mandate of the Court, which was established in 2006, is to complement and 
reinforce the functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter ‘the Court’) has 
jurisdiction to deal with all cases and disputes submitted to it regarding the 
interpretation and application of the charter, the protocol, and any other relevant 
human rights instrument ratified by the states concerned. Under article 4 of the 
protocol, the court may, at the request of a member state of the AU, any of the 
organs of the AU or any African organisation recognised by the AU, provide an 
opinion on any legal matter relating to the charter or any other relevant human rights 
instrument, provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter 
under examination by the commission. As of 24 February 2015, the protocol had 
been ratified by twenty-seven AU members while twenty-seven states have signed 
but not ratified. Of the state parties to the protocol, only seven have deposited the 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the court to receive cases from individuals 
and NGOs.99 The low level of ratifications and declarations threaten to limit the 
court’s role as a human rights watchdog within the AU. 
The Court has finalised in the order of twenty-four cases and five advisory opinions 
since it started functioning in 2006.100 These deal with a wide range of human rights 
issues. Article 31 of the protocol establishing the court requires the Court to submit a 
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report to each regular session of the assembly of heads of state and government on 
its work during the previous year, specifying, in particular, cases in which a state has 
not complied with the Court’s judgment. 
In 2008, the AU merged this court with the Court of Justice of the African Union to 
form a single court by adopting the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights. As of February 2015, the protocol has received thirty 
signatures and only five ratifications101 falling well short of the fifteen ratifications 
required for entry into force.102 Although practical considerations played a role in 
bringing the two courts together,103 the strengthening of AU institutions lacking the 
necessary powers to effectively carry out their mandate is paramount.  
The promotion and protection of human rights should be advanced by the Court, by 
remedying what Naldi104 describes as one of the basic weaknesses of the African 
human rights system, namely, ‘the lack of an authoritative, robust and effective 
supervisory and enforcement mechanism’. The reluctance of AU members to ratify 
the protocol may be indicative of their unwillingness to achieve just that – robust 
enforcement of human rights by a supranational African body which might infringe on 
national sovereignty and the concomitant impunity of political elite. Be that as it may, 
even a fully functional court cannot be expected to solve all Africa’s human rights 
problems. Judicial resolution is but one method by which to address the problem; the 
many others include a change of attitudes, dispute resolution through effective 
diplomacy, enforcement of democracy and good governance practices, and 
economic growth that benefits all components of society. 
The Peace and Security Council 
The PSC was, as indicated above, added as an AU organ by the Protocol on 
Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union105 in 2003. It is designated 
as ‘the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts’ according to article 9 of the said protocol with powers to be 
determined by the assembly in a separate protocol. Furthermore, a Protocol relating 
to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 106 duly 
adopted in 2002 and entered into force in 2003, singled out continuing armed 
conflicts as the most important reason for socio-economic decline and civilian 
suffering on the continent.107 The collective security structure seeks to address the 
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scourge of conflict; however, it focuses on security from armed conflict which 
presents but one narrow dimension within the broader human security context. The 
wider context of security is recognised by referring to the importance of building 
strong democratic institutions, the observance of human rights and the rule of law in 
the promotion of durable peace and security. Without these, security in both the 
narrow and wide senses would remain elusive. The PSC, seen as a regional 
equivalent of the UN Security Council, is tasked with the promotion of peace, but 
also conflict prevention, peace building, and post-conflict reconstruction. 108  The 
protocol introduces a continental early warning system (CEWS)109 to anticipate and 
prevent conflicts; a Panel of the Wise110 to support the PSC in matters such as 
conflict prevention and an African Standby Force (ASF) 111  to be deployed in 
missions supporting peace and intervention. The effectiveness of the CEWS and 
ASF is widely questioned in the light of the AU’s inconsistent track record in dealing 
with regional conflicts since the PSC’s inception. 112  These can, inter alia, be 
attributed to tension and a lack of communication within regional systems, the 
withholding of intelligence by national states, and differences between African 
leaders on the nature and composition of the ASF.113 Clarity as to when and what 
form intervention should take is a complicated matter and remains elusive. 
The powers of the PSC, listed under article 7 (a-r), cover a wide scope. They include 
strong powers to be exercised in conjunction with the chairperson of the commission 
such as the institution of sanctions in cases of unconstitutional changes of 
government,114 ensuring the implementation of AU and international conventions 
aimed at combatting terrorism, 115  and taking appropriate action where the 
independence and sovereignty of a member state is threatened by acts of 
aggression.116 The notion of supranational powers is reinforced by sub articles 2 and 
3 of article 7: 
2. The member states agree that in carrying out its duties under the present 
Protocol, the Peace and Security Council acts on their behalf. 
3. The member states agree to accept and implement the decisions of the 
Peace and Security Council, in accordance with the Constitutive Act. 
These provisions indicate the transfer of sovereign powers to an international 
institution and moreover, a commitment to accept the binding nature of decisions by 
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undertaking to implement them. This is perhaps the best example of 
supranationalism as a source of AU law within current AU institutions. 
The protocols introduce a number of expansions to AU powers. Importantly it adds a 
principle that provides for AU intervention in a member state, pursuant to an 
assembly decision, in respect of grave circumstances including war crimes, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and restoring peace and stability where the 
legitimate order is under threat.117 If operative, this provision has the potential to 
grant powers to the assembly that could be compared to the UN Security Council. 
The power of intervention and the endowment of the PSC with decision-making 
power hold the potential for law creation at a supranational level. 
Having analysed the nature of the original powers granted by the AU Constitutive Act 
to AU organs, it is now necessary to turn to secondary instruments, namely treaties 
adopted by the AU to establish whether it permits enforceable action. For purposes 
of the present discussion, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance,118 which was adopted and entered into force in 2012, will be the focus 
here. This particular treaty is selected because it ties in with the creation of a sense 
of community and development of mutual values that the founding fathers of 
European integrations valued as building blocks for supranationalism. 
 
The AU’s commitment to democratic governance 
‘Democratic entitlement’ as the preferred system of government gained international 
support in the post-Cold War period,119 prompting western states to use the demand 
for democracy and ‘structural change’ as bargaining chips in their engagement with 
Africa. Such conditions were actively opposed by African states and the AU, insisting 
that Africa will embrace democracy on its own terms and conditions and advocating 
‘African solutions for African problems’. 120 
 The AU has taken up the challenge to build democracy through a series of initiatives 
assisting transformation from the dictatorships of the 1990s. Its Constitutive Act 
refers to the importance of human rights protection, consolidation of democratic 
institutions and culture, good governance, and the rule of law. It also provides that 
governments that come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be 
21 
 
allowed to participate in AU activities. Major challenges the AU faces include 
disputed elections, rigged election results, and an unwillingness of the ruling party to 
relinquish power after electoral defeat. 121  Democracy appears to have been 
embraced by African leaders - provided that they remain in power. Roughly one fifth 
of the elections in sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 have led to violence. 122 This 
causes conflict and mob violence to erupt as can be seen in the cases of Zimbabwe, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire.123 Usually, the violence results 
from members of the ruling party seeking to intimidate the opposition and the 
opposition, in turn, challenging unfair election results.124  
It is against this background that the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance125 was adopted and entered into force in 2012. The charter aims to 
foster a political culture of change of power based on regular, free and fair elections. 
It sets out an AU understanding of democracy. Despite the legal character obtained 
through entry into force, the charter provisions are in the main phrased in non-
prescriptive language. The aims refer to undertakings to develop, promote and 
enhance various democratic principles. There is, however, a direct obligation to 
‘prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional change of government as a serious 
threat to stability, peace, security and development.’ 126  Article 23 provides for 
sanctions in cases of unconstitutional change of government which include ‘any 
refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or 
candidate after free, fair and regular elections.’ 127 This provision makes it very clear 
that clinging to power illegally by a ruling party after loss of an election, or indefinitely 
perpetuating its government, are grounds for sanction. When the PSC considers that 
this has happened, it has the power to suspend the offending state from AU 
activities, though still not releasing it from AU related obligations such as human 
rights.128 The AU shall then take the initiative in restoring democracy to the state in 
question, and the perpetrators may be tried under a competent African court. Other 
forms of sanction and punitive measures may also follow, and AU parties may not 
harbour perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government – a very 
comprehensive approach in dealing with the phenomenon if ever enforced. African 
leaders are, however, known to change their constitutions to prolong their grip on 
power, making their illegitimate and undemocratic rule ‘constitutional’ as in the cases 
of Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Nigeria.129 After adoption, but prior to entry into force of 
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this declaration, the AU refused to suspend either Zimbabwe or Kenya in 2007 and 
2008 respectively, despite refusal of the ruling party to accept the opposition’s 
electoral victories. This constituted a violation of the AU Charter according to 
Abass. 130  The AU has shown that it is prepared to act differently when other 
examples of unconstitutional changes take place such as a putsch, coup d’état or 
mercenary intervention.131 
There are definite indications that AU practice under the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance has entered the domain of supranationality. 
The charter certainly provides the theoretical possibility of enforceable AU action that 
would limit state sovereignty. The action does stop short of obligatory settlement of 
disputes and direct effect of AU decisions in member states, which falls outside the 
mandate of this particular instrument.  
Is it premature to coin the term ‘African Union law’? 
A fully fledged regional legal system can only take root where participating states 
agree to move beyond the confines of interstatism. Although EU integration and EU 
law cannot be regarded as a blueprint for similar practices elsewhere, it does present 
the best developed example providing guidance of how a regional legal system may 
function within an integrated community of sovereign states. It is suggested that the 
theories on the development of law of regional integration assessing EU law 
underpins regional integration globally, be it in Europe or Africa. It grapples with the 
essential requirement for supranational law-making, namely the surrendering of 
some sovereign powers to a representative regional institution. Following theorists of 
European integration, supranationalism, or at least core elements within particular 
functional domains, is required before a supranational legal system can take root. 
There is no reason why the AU cannot in principle develop an AU legal system. It is 
a continental organisation with the required international legal standing. What is 
required are the necessary mechanisms set up through the primary constitutional 
agreements, and for these to be upheld by both AU institutions and member states. 
The core elements needed to foster a supranational African legal system include 
direct effect and supremacy over national legislation. These must be supported by a 
sense of community and willingness to transfer some sovereign powers to a 
supranational decision-making body. Elements of supranationalism where the AU 
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currently clearly falls short include institutional decision-making within the AU and 
obligatory settlement of disputes, and were not considered in establishing the 
development of AU law. Although core supranationality is par for the course as far as 
the development of AU law is concerned, its development does not follow a 
particular model but instead appears to be rather functionally dependent on strategic 
needs.  
Institutional development within the AU coupled with a commitment to democracy 
and human rights have contributed to a slow but steady integration process in Africa. 
AU institutions were expanded to include the PAP, PSC and the African Court of 
Justice; the role of the court and the ACHPR have gained more prominence; and the 
AU became more bold, even if inconsistently so, in dealing with electoral 
irregularities, human rights and governance issues. Integration measures must 
however be backed up by law, giving the AU the necessary powers to take and 
enforce decisions. Examples where supranational decision-making powers already 
exist include hard powers of the assembly and powers to be exercised by the PSC 
particularly through articles 7(2) and (3). Although indicative of an emerging trend, 
the limited cases referred to above might not be enough to justify the existence of a 
continental legal system as of yet. A further concern is the absence of consistent 
enforcement of existing powers by AU institutions. However, what is essential from a 
legal perspective is the granting of legislative powers to the PAP backed up by an 
effective court system to enforce treaties and deal with disputes. This will take AU 
law beyond the confines of dealing with security issues to embrace a broader scope 
of legal regulation. More comprehensive law-making powers will inevitably also 
impact on participating nation states by adding another source of law and placing 
national law within a broader hierarchy of norms.  
One must accept that regional integration, once it is accepted as a political objective, 
is a slow and arduous process; it has been particularly so in the case of Africa. This 
is due to a variety of mostly political factors. Regional integration challenges 
nationalism and it challenges an absolute view of state sovereignty where states and 
their leaders are shielded from outside intervention. Sovereignty and non-
intervention are notions firmly embedded in post-colonial African culture. Following 
pan-African thinking, African leaders are keen to unite against outside efforts to 
influence them. These influences can come from the International Criminal Court, the 
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United Nations, the EU or international financial institutions. Enforcement of 
international treaty norms, which African states are party to, are often regarded as 
singling out Africa as a target. Pan-African ideals do not seem to include critical 
engagement with politically deviant behaviour by individual African states and 
leaders. This culminates in the often noted lack of political will of African leaders to 
pay more than lip service to strengthening regional institutions that might be able to 
call members to account. There seems to be a huge divide between the 
philosophical objective to unite Africa, and the creation of an essential institutional 
regime on the ground needed for such unification. An emerging African Union law is 
an important step in bridging the gap.   
Conclusion 
 The discussion above showed a slow but steady development in African integration 
over the past ten years which takes it beyond the confines of pure state-centrism to 
include definite supranational and functional elements driven by strategic interest. It 
also illustrated the close link between law and integration; and supranationalism and 
law. Despite many differences, much can be learnt from the European experience 
and the role played by EU law in this regard. As in Europe, legal rules need to 
emerge in Africa to structure integration and to introduce clear guidelines in various 
spheres of activity. Using law within a pan-African context will serve to counter 
absolute sovereignty of AU members by introducing shared objectives and 
accountability.  In the foreseeable future African Union law might be an accepted 
component in the training of African lawyers.   
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